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Case C-400/25 P: Appeal brought on 13 June 2025 by Gennady Nikolayevich Timchenko against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 2 April 2025 in Case T-297/23, Gennady Nikolayevich Timchenko v Council of the European Union
(Case C-400/25 P)
Language of the case: French
Parties
Appellant: Gennady Nikolayevich Timchenko (represented by: S. Bonifassi, T. Bontinck, E. Fedorova and J. Goffin, avocats)
Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union
Form of order sought
The appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:
— set aside in its entirety the judgment of the General Court of the European Union delivered on 2 April 2025 by the First Chamber, Extended Composition, of the General Court of the European Union in Case T-297/23;
— consequently, grant the forms of order sought by the appellant before the General Court of the European Union, namely:
— under Article 263 TFEU, annulment of:
Decision (CFSP) 2023/572 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571, and
Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 and Implementing Regulation 2023/1765,
in so far as those acts concern the appellant;
— under Article 268 TFEU, compensation in respect of the non-material harm that the appellant claims to have suffered as a result of the adoption of those acts;
— order the respondent to pay the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.
Grounds of appeal and main arguments
The appellant raises ten grounds in support of his appeal.
1. The appellant submits that the General Court erred in law in ruling that the Council did not create a presumption of interdependence between leading businesspersons operating in Russia and the Government of the Russian Federation.
2. The appellant submits that the General Court erred in law in reversing the burden of proof and finding that the appellant was required to disprove interdependence.
3. The appellant argues that the General Court misinterpreted the term “leading” in the legal context of Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014.
4. The appellant contends that the General Court failed to properly justify the proportionality of the first part of designation criterion (g), thus breaching its obligation to state reasons.
5. The appellant submits that the General Court erred in applying Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation No 269/2014 without demonstrating any positive action undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty.
6. The appellant asserts that the General Court erred in applying Article 3(1)(d) of Regulation No 269/2014 without evidence of support for Russian decision-makers.
7. The appellant claims that the General Court substituted itself for the Council by presenting justifications that were not originally given in the statement of reasons.
8. The appellant submits that the General Court incorrectly accepted that the appellant was a “leading businessperson” under Article 3(1)(g).
9. The appellant argues that the General Court erred in finding that Article 29 TEU allows the Council to restrict the freedom of movement of an EU citizen.
10. The appellant submits that the restriction on freedom of movement was disproportionate and lacked justification, as it failed to demonstrate any personal conduct representing a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to EU interests.