Summary:
Le 1er septembre 2025, l’ancien président américain Donald Trump a annoncé qu’Nvidia et AMD avaient accepté de remettre 15 % des revenus de la vente de leurs puces H20 et MI308 afin d’obtenir des licences d’exportation pour la Chine. Cette initiative vise à atténuer les tensions commerciales tout en répondant aux préoccupations géopolitiques et économiques liées aux exportations technologiques. L’accord pourrait générer plus de 2 milliards de dollars pour le gouvernement américain d’ici la fin de l’année, mais soulève des questions sur sa validité constitutionnelle et juridique, ainsi que sur ses impacts plus larges sur les politiques commerciales technologiques. Les développements futurs pourraient inclure des concessions mutuelles entre les États-Unis et la Chine concernant la conception de puces et les restrictions à l’exportation de logiciels, bien que la Chine continue de promouvoir des alternatives locales aux produits Nvidia et AMD.
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The recent decision by the Trump administration to reauthorize exports of NVIDIA and AMD’s H20 and MI308 chips to China on the condition that 15% of the revenue be shared with the U.S. government has stirred a complex mix of legal, ethical, and industrial debates. Such agreements raise questions about the legality of effectively imposing a revenue-sharing mechanism that some experts have labeled a “stealth export tax.” Analyzing this situation requires unpacking the legal basis, ethical implications, and broader industry ramifications.
**Legal Context**
Under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress is granted the exclusive power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Taxing exports is explicitly prohibited under Article I, Section 9. Although the revenue-sharing arrangement does not explicitly fit the description of a tax as traditionally applied, its structure—a condition tied directly to the export of goods—raises constitutional concerns. If challenged, courts might be compelled to determine whether this constitutes an indirect violation of the export-tax ban.
International trade agreements could also be implicated, as such conditions may be deemed to contravene commitments under the World Trade Organization (WTO) frameworks. The WTO generally prohibits discriminatory practices in global trade, and competitors of NVIDIA and AMD might contest this as an unfair advantage granted to U.S. companies via state-intervened terms.
**Ethical Analysis**
From an ethical standpoint, the revenue-sharing agreement opens avenues for critique. Some view the arrangement as a coercive move rather than a fair negotiation, undermining the principle of corporate autonomy. It sets a precedent where governments may leverage critical export permissions as bargaining chips to extract financial benefits. This raises ethical questions about the balance of power between corporations and states and whether it encourages exploitative governance practices.
Further, the agreement intensifies anxieties about the use of advanced technologies in geopolitical rivalries. While the Biden administration’s original 2023 export restrictions were aimed at curbing China’s advancements in artificial intelligence, skeptics argue that this shift signals a prioritization of financial gain over national security concerns. On the flip side, proponents argue this revenue-sharing clause could fund domestic R&D efforts, potentially benefitting the American AI sector in the long term.
**Industry Implications**
For NVIDIA and AMD, the agreement is both a challenge and an opportunity. Although the arrangement allows them to recapture the lucrative Chinese market—reportedly worth billions—it introduces new financial and strategic constraints. With 15% of their revenue from these sales diverted, profit margins may shrink, creating pressure to adjust pricing either domestically or internationally.
Ripple effects on other technology sectors are also foreseeable. If this model proves profitable, the U.S. government might seek to replicate it across other industries, broadening its scope beyond semiconductors. This could deter foreign buyers worried about increased costs and deepen unilateralism in trade policy. For example, if applied to the export of software design tools or quantum computing technologies, it could catalyze the creation of alternative international suppliers, diminishing American market dominance.
**Concrete Examples and Market Dynamics**
The Chinese tech industry is already responding to these shifts. Domestic firms, incentivized by Beijing’s “Made in China 2025” strategy, are ramping up efforts to produce AI chips locally. For example, companies like Huawei and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) have accelerated R&D for chips that could rival imported products. Additionally, China’s tighter restrictions on the use of foreign technology in public infrastructures exacerbate pressure on vendors like NVIDIA and AMD. Such policies aim to reduce dependency on U.S. exports altogether.
The agreement’s financial implications for the U.S. government are notable; it is estimated to generate upwards of $2 billion before year’s end. However, the long-term viability of such arrangements remains uncertain, especially if trade partners begin imposing reciprocal measures or if U.S. companies seek to bypass such requirements through offshore operations.
In conclusion, the revenue-sharing condition attached to H20 and MI308 chip exports to China exemplifies a novel and contentious intersection of trade policy, corporate governance, and technological strategy. It offers an immediate economic benefit to the U.S. but raises significant legal and ethical questions while prompting broader shifts in the global semiconductor landscape. Policymakers, corporations, and international regulators will need to grapple with the precedent set by this agreement as they shape the future of techno-economic trade relations.